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


14 October 1965

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM



SINO-PAKISTANI COOPERATION IN THE KASHMIR WAR

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SC No. 10519/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
14 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Sino-Pakistani Cooperation in the Kashmir War

1. China's open backing of Pakistan during the recent hostilities by propaganda and diplomatic support, as well as by diversionary activities along India's northern borders, raises questions as to the degree of coordination and collaboration between Rawalpindi and Peking both before and during the crisis. The limited evidence available is subject to a variety of interpretations and thus makes any definitive conclusions difficult at this time. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges suggests that both countries attempted to keep in step as events unfolded, but that the amount of detailed joint planning was limited.

The State of Sino-Pakistani Relations

2. The current Kashmir crisis came at a time when relations between Pakistan and China--India's two major enemies--had grown quite close. For more than two years Peking had been assiduously wooing the Pakistanis, playing with considerable success upon Pakistani apprehensions over the US military assistance program to India which began during the Sino-Indian border hostilities in 1962. From the start Pakistani leaders were convinced that anything the US gave New Delhi would eventually be used against them, and they were receptive to Peking's advances. Rawalpindi believed that it could use the Chinese menace as a counterweight to India's preponderant strength without seriously compromising Pakistan's positions elsewhere.

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3. Both Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi repeatedly stopped for talks with the Pakistanis during their many trips to and from Africa in recent years, and President Ayub visited Peking last March. Numerous sports, cultural, scientific, commercial, and governmental groups exchanged visits. In August 1963 the Pakistani airline became the first line outside the bloc to be permitted to establish regular service to Canton and Shanghai. In October 1964 the Chinese granted Pakistan a \$60-million interest-free credit, and last March amid considerable fanfare Chen Yi signed the final protocol on the demarcation of their common frontier.

4. [REDACTED] Sino-Pakistani mutual defense accord or understanding was reached during Chou's visit to Karachi in February 1964. Although some kind of loose understanding probably was achieved, it is likely that it was cast in terms which provided Peking with considerable latitude for deciding when and how it might come into force.

5. This summer as the Kashmir crisis came to a boil there was undoubtedly close consultation between Peking and Rawalpindi, but developments during September do not appear to reflect either long-term policy coordination or much in the way of joint tactical planning before the crisis broke. The fast-moving and unexpected developments during recent weeks put the Sino-Pakistani relationship to the test and exposed it for what it really is--a self-serving and essentially unstable relationship.

#### Early Diplomatic and Propaganda Support

6. Peking's response began in a low key and gradually intensified as the crisis became more heated. The initial propaganda support given to Pakistan seems to have been consistent with Pakistan's aims--to focus world attention on the unsettled Kashmir question--while avoiding a stridency that might have suggested Sino-Pakistani plotting. The Chinese, having no vital ideological or political stake in the Kashmir skirmishing and with heavy commitments elsewhere, showed no disposition to get out in front of Pakistan

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on the issue. On the other hand, the Chinese seemed willing to lend whatever low-risk support was required to preserve and further cement their ties with Pakistan.

7. The degree of consultation between Pakistan and China prior to 1 September is not clear, but it is likely that Peking was apprised at least in a general way of Ayub's plans to infiltrate Indian Kashmir. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. The thrust of China's propaganda coverage--initially limited to reportorial accounts of the clashes in Kashmir slanted to play up Indian culpability--did not change markedly until 4 September, when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Karachi en route to Mali. Following discussions with Bhutto, Chen publicly denounced the Indians for provoking hostilities, for violating the 1949 cease-fire line, and for "aggravating the conflict." His public promises of backing for Pakistan, however, were guarded. He declared only that China "firmly supports" efforts by Pakistan to strike back at "armed provocations" by India.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] China allegedly agreed to provide arms and ammunition if the need arose, to bring as much diplomatic pressure as possible to bear on the Indian Government, and to champion Pakistan's position among the nonaligned states. [REDACTED] China agreed to open a "second front" if required by the exigencies of the war but only by mutual agreement after renewed consultation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It would seem that as of 4 September--two days before the Indian attack in the Punjab--the Chinese were committed to little more than further consultations in the event the war expanded.

12. It seems likely that before the warfare spread to the Punjab both China and Pakistan wished to keep the Chinese role limited. The input of US military assistance, which was essential for the maintenance of Pakistan's military machine, had not yet been suspended. Rawalpindi must have recognized that too active a Chinese role would jeopardize continued US help. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13. On the other hand, India's opening of a front in the Punjab introduced the new danger that New Delhi would bring in forces from its Central and Eastern commands to overwhelm the Pakistani defenders. This threat must have heightened Rawalpindi's interest in some sort of Chinese diversionary activity to tie

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down potential Indian reinforcements. The suspension of US military aid on 8 September probably deepened Pakistan's concern and lessened its inhibitions about seeking help wherever it could be found.

14. China responded to the Indian attack by sharpening its propaganda campaign and hinting that Peking might become more directly involved. Peking issued its first official statement on the crisis on 7 September, and followed it up with a note to the Indians the next day. These messages charged India with aggression against Pakistan, and excoriated the Indians for enlarging what had been simply border clashes into a "general conflict" which constituted a grave threat to the peace of "this part of Asia." The statement and note paired these accusations with renewed protests over alleged Indian violations of the Tibetan border opposite Ladakh and Sikkim.

15. Shortly after the Indian attack in the Punjab, Pakistan began to seek alternative sources of arms and ammunition to sustain its war effort in the event Western-US aid was cut off. Only two of Pakistan's alliance partners--Iran and Turkey--appeared likely to provide even token support, and it soon became clear that the amounts they could offer would not be sufficient to keep Pakistani armed forces supplied.

16. On 8 September a Pakistan International Airlines Boeing 720B carried a Defense Ministry team headed by Pakistan's Air Marshal Asghar Khan to Peking. A brief stop there may have provided an opportunity for discussion with the Chinese, but it appears that the major objective of the mission was to seek material assistance from Indonesia. The team arrived in Djakarta on the 9th. After a day of discussions, Asghar Khan and his group returned to China on the 10th and to Karachi on the 11th.

17. The specific results of the Asghar Khan mission are not known, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It appears, however, that the hostilities in the Punjab ended before any shipments were made. There is no evidence of a similar agreement with the Chinese. There would, in fact, be serious

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obstacles in the way of any Chinese attempt to supply Pakistan with military material. Apart from the formidable delivery problem, military equipment from Peking's stocks--mainly of Soviet design--would not be compatible with Rawalpindi's inventory of US-supplied material and would be unfamiliar to the Pakistani armed forces.

The Chinese Ultimatum

18. Unwilling or unable to provide significant assistance in the form of military hardware, Peking sought to help Pakistan by stepping up the psychological pressure on New Delhi. The Chinese followed up their harsh government statement and threatening diplomatic note of 7-8 September with a public warning by Chou En-lai on 9 September that India must bear responsibility for "all the consequences arising from its extended aggression." At the same time the Chinese were circulating threatening statements through at least one of their embassies abroad. The Chinese first secretary in Damascus [REDACTED] told the editor of a major Syrian daily on 9 September that Peking was ready to provide arms and troops to Pakistan if and when required.

19. Peking's pressure campaign reached its peak on 16 September when the Chinese issued a virtual ultimatum to New Delhi demanding that the Indians immediately stop "provocations" along the frontier, return at once Tibetan people and livestock allegedly seized by the Indian armed forces, and within three days dismantle "military structures of aggression" built on the Chinese side of the Sikkim border, or face "grave consequences."

20. Chinese military preparations before and immediately after issuance of the ultimatum make it clear that Peking's warning to the Indians was something more than a piece of psychological warfare bluster. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22.- The pattern of Chinese activity [REDACTED] strongly suggests that at the time when the ultimatum was delivered Peking intended to launch diversionary probes along the Sino-Indian border when the three-day deadline expired on 19 September, unless the situation had changed in Pakistan's favor. Military forces required for sharp, limited-objective attacks were already in place [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there were, however, no indications that the Chinese were preparing for a full-scale attack on India.

23. We have no conclusive evidence that Peking's ultimatum of 16 September and the concurrent Chinese military activity were in response to a request from Rawalpindi, but the developments during the previous week make it seem likely that Pakistan called for more help shortly after 11 September, when Indian forces regained the initiative in the fighting. The Pakistani counterattack in the Punjab had been blunted and although the renewed Indian drive toward Lahore had also been stalled by about 13 September, Indian pressure in the Sialkot area was being stepped up. The Pakistanis had suffered extensive losses in their unsuccessful efforts to break through Indian lines. Moreover, on 8 September all US military aid had been suspended, cutting off the principal if not the only source of replacement parts and munitions for the hard-pressed Pakistani armed forces. Under these circumstances Ayub Khan, urged on by Bhutto and the other firebrands in the government, may have decided in desperation to ask for a Chinese demonstration along the Sino-Indian frontier in the hope that it would break New Delhi's apparent determination to press on with a war of attrition.



24. If Pakistan, in fact, called for more positive support just before 13 September when evidence of Chinese steps to bring their military forces in Tibet to full readiness began to appear, the delay in Peking's response must have been disheartening. It seems probable that the Chinese, like the Pakistanis, had underestimated both New Delhi's resolution and the effectiveness of the Indian armed forces and were unable or unwilling to react at once. By the time Peking did move, Ayub Khan may have concluded that the kind of help he could expect would be too little and too late to salvage the situation and decided to forgo assistance which would almost certainly foreclose the possibility of Western efforts to restrain the Indians and to promote a "reasonable" settlement.

25. There are a number of indications that Ayub was considering ways of ending the conflict shortly after the Chinese ultimatum was delivered to the Indians. [REDACTED] Pakistan informed the Indonesians on 17 September that military aid would not be required after all, and on 18 September Pakistani Finance Minister Shoaib told Ambassador McConaughy that Ayub was "wavering" on the question of a cease-fire.

26. [REDACTED] Ayub sent an urgent message to Peking, perhaps on the 17th, asking the Chinese not to intervene. On 21 September Ayub [REDACTED] sent word to Peking [REDACTED] cautioning the Chinese to stay out of the conflict. Receipt of such a message would explain Peking's sudden and apparently unexpected decision to have Foreign Minister Chen Yi--on his way home from Africa--remain in Damascus for a 25-hour "rest" on 18 September instead of going to Karachi as planned, and then continue his trip, bypassing Pakistan and returning to Peking via Afghanistan.

27. Chen's change in travel plans and the layover in Syria probably reflect surprise and confusion in Peking. The prospect of having to climb down from their ultimatum must have been exceedingly distasteful to the Chinese leaders, and they may have used the interval to urge the Pakistanis to carry on with the war. If so, Peking's arguments were no match for the

combined force of Indian arms and steadily increasing political pressure from the West. On 19 September [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ayub the Pakistani President had appeared "worried and chastened" and had repeatedly expressed Pakistan's desire for a cease-fire, if only it could be made "meaningful" in terms of renewed discussion on Kashmir.

28. It seems unlikely that the Chinese pressed very hard in any effort to persuade Ayub that he should stand firm. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peking probably decided to salvage what it could in Sino-Pakistani relations for future exploitation by going along with Ayub's decision as gracefully as possible.

29. On 19 September, the Chinese began the humiliating process of backing away from their ultimatum by delivering a note to the Indians which extended the deadline until midnight 22 September. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it prepared the ground for a shift to the position that Peking would not have to chastise the Indians, because New Delhi had met the most important Chinese demands. Three days later--after agreement to a cease-fire had been reached--NCNA broadcast the text of an article in People's Daily by authoritative "observer" asserting that although the matter is "far from closed," the Indians had complied with the most important demands of the ultimatum. Finally, on 24 September, Peking made this official by broadcasting the text of two diplomatic notes asserting that intruding Indian troops in the Sikkim area had been withdrawn "within the specified time limit."

#### Prospects

30. While outwardly Sino-Pakistani relations are likely to appear as warm as ever in the months ahead, and Peking will seek to consolidate and increase its ties with Rawalpindi, recent events have probably created friction and raised serious doubts on both sides. The Chinese were almost certainly angered by

Pakistan's last-minute request that they not intervene--a move Peking probably sees as weak-kneed, knuckling under to Western pressure--and Rawalpindi's agreement to a cease-fire under UN auspices has no doubt been especially galling.

31. On 4 October, at a Peking banquet for the visiting Pakistani minister of commerce, Vice Premier Po I-po [REDACTED] said that Sino-Pakistani friendship "can stand all tests." In the past, use of this formulation by the Chinese has indicated the existence of differences. Despite such points of difference, however, the interests of Peking and Rawalpindi continue to coincide in many areas of foreign policy, and any immediate deterioration in relations seems unlikely.

32. A major factor in shaping the future course of the relationship will be the degree to which these common interests are offset by Pakistan's success in winning material and diplomatic support elsewhere. Rawalpindi's initial moves following the cease-fire suggest that Ayub is resigned to trying one last time for an effective UN settlement, although he has little faith that Pakistan's interests will be any better served this time than in the past. He may also ask the US, the UK, and perhaps even the USSR to apply pressure upon the Indians. As long as he has some slight hope that these diplomatic efforts will succeed, his dealings with the Chinese are likely to remain circumspect. If it becomes obvious, however, that there is nothing more to be gained from the West, a deeply frustrated Pakistan probably will consider efforts to move closer to the Chinese. (Annex and Map)

ANNEX

CHRONOLOGY

- 11 February 1965 - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] states that Ayub would discuss Kashmir problem on forthcoming visit to Peking.
- 6-7 March 1965 - Ayub visits Communist China. Communiqué issued 7 March noted with concern the continued Kashmir dispute and reaffirmed that the dispute should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.
- 25 March 1965 - Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrives in Rawalpindi for five-day visit.
- 2 May 1965 [REDACTED]
- 25 May 1965 [REDACTED]
- 2 June 1965 - Chou En-lai arrives in Rawalpindi en route to Africa and spends a full day in discussions with Ayub.
- 1 July 1965 - Rann of Kutch cease-fire agreement comes into effect. The agreement calls for ministerial meetings between the two countries, followed by submission of the issue to a tribunal if talks fail.
- Both sides warily pull back from Punjab confrontation.

- 3 July 1965      Pakistan is informed of US intent to recommend postponement of World Bank consortium pledging session, then scheduled for 27 July, because of US inability to make a pledge at that time.
- 5-8 August 1965    -- Pakistani infiltration begins with first batch [REDACTED] sent across the line, Indian reaction is to meet infiltration head on, while appealing to U Thant to declare against Pakistan.
- 17 August 1965    - Pakistani information secretary when queried by Pakistani newsman as to whether there was new assurance of support from Peking states that "an understanding" has been in effect for a long time and that China will attack India if New Delhi's forces push into "settled areas," that is those not in dispute.
- 17-24 August 1965 - In the absence of a UN report and faced with further infiltrations, India moves first across the cease-fire line at Kargil and Tithwal, and finally across the line to cut off the Uri-Poonch salient.
- 1 September 1965 - Pakistan replies with drive in the Chhamb area aimed at cutting road to Poonch; Pakistan also, for the first time, acknowledges direct role as adversary. Indian reply is to introduce air power to cover retreating Indian forces.
- 4 September 1965 - Chen Yi and Bhutto conduct lengthy talks in Karachi when the Chinese foreign minister is en route to Africa.

- 5 September 1965 - Chen at press conference before departure says Peking "completely sympathizes with Kashmiri peoples' just struggle."
- 6 September 1965 - Indians launch attacks toward Lahore and Sialkot which penetrate about five miles before being stopped. UN Security Council meets to urge a cease-fire.
- Following press conference at midnight Foreign Minister Bhutto [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] that Chen offered military assistance on his recent visit but the Pakistanis declined on the grounds that such assistance was not yet needed.
- 7 September 1965 - Harshly worded Chinese Government statement terms Indian action against Pakistan "naked aggression" and alleges Indians occupying Chinese territory in Sikkim border area.
- Three Pakistani transport planes arrive in Southwest China from East Pakistan, apparently carrying "ferry" pilots.
- 8 September 1965 - Indians open two new fronts by attacking toward Sialkot from Jammu in the north and driving into the Sind toward Hyderabad in the south. UN Secretary General U Thant arrives in Karachi on his peace-seeking mission.
- US suspends military aid to both India and Pakistan.
  - Iranian prime minister leaves for Turkey to discuss aid to Pakistan.



- Threatening Chinese Communist noted to New Delhi raises issue of Indian military structures in Sikkim pass areas again and makes parallel between Indian actions against Pakistan; also alleges Indian provocations on Sino-Indian frontier.

8-11 September 1965 - Special Pakistani Boeing 720 jet on secret round-trip flight from Karachi to Djakarta via Peking [REDACTED]

- 9 September 1965
- A Pakistani counterattack in the Lahore sector pushes the Indians back to the border carries into Indian territory in the southern part of the front. Chou En-lai warns India that it must bear responsibility for "all the consequences arising from its extended aggression."
  - UN Secretary General Thant arrives in Pakistan.
  - Liu Shao-chi talks with Pak Ambassador in Peking and gives note replying to message from Ayub.
  - First Secretary of Chinese Communist Embassy in Syria [REDACTED] told editor of prominent Damascus daily that Chinese are ready to provide arms and troops to Pakistan if and when requested.

10 September 1965 [REDACTED]

- 11 September 1965
- Indian counterattack pushes back into Pakistan in the Lahore area and regains much of the lost ground, although Pakistani forces continue to hold some Indian territory.

- 
- 12 September 1965 - U Thant leaves Pakistan for New Delhi having been told by the Pakistanis that they would insist upon a plebiscite in Kashmir as an essential condition for a cease-fire.
- Indian forces advance to within 2 miles of Sialkot.
  - Indian reply to Chinese note rejects charges of Sikkim border violations and offers to allow "neutral observers."
- 13 September 1965 - Official TASS statement appeals for peace and takes Chinese to task by condemning "those whose inciting statements help fan the conflict."
- 

- 14 September 1965 - U Thant proposes a cease-fire to take effect on the evening of 14 September--neither side complies.
- ChiComs issue low-key protest on Indian failure to return assets of Bank of China branches closed down by Indians in 1962.
  - Secretary Rusk publicly warns the Chinese "to stay out" of Indo-Pakistan conflict.

15 September 1965 -





- Ayub at press conference calls on President Johnson to use US influence to halt conflict; he indicates demand for a plebiscite within three months could be negotiated.
- U Thant renews his call for an end to hostilities. New Delhi is agreeable to an end to the fighting--if Pakistan agrees--but Shastri reiterates Indian determination to hold on to Kashmir. Pakistan rejects the proposal.

15-16 September 1965 - Second Pakistani Boeing 720 since 8 September from Karachi to China.

[REDACTED]

16 September 1965 - Chinese ultimatum demands that New Delhi dismantle alleged Indian posts across the Tibetan border from Sikkim within three days.

16-17 September 1965

[REDACTED]

17 September 1965

[REDACTED]

- India replies to Chinese ultimatum by agreeing to a joint investigation of defense installations along the Sikkim border, but concedes no border violations.
- In notes to India and Pakistan Kosygin offers Soviet good offices and invites Shastri and Ayub to Tashkent.

18 September 1965

- [REDACTED]
- Foreign Minister Chen Yi who is returning from Africa makes last-minute change of travel plans and stops over in Syria on 18 September for 25-hour "rest," before proceeding on the 19th to Peking via Afghanistan. A stop in Karachi was apparently scheduled, but the 11th hour change was probably made at Ayub's request in order to avoid the appearance of Sino-Pakistani collusion in the Kashmir conflict.

19 September 1965

- Chinese note to Indians postpones deadline on ultimatum until midnight 22 September (Peking time). [REDACTED] thrust appears designed to undercut assertions that Chinese are seeking to provoke a war. [REDACTED] lays groundwork for Chinese shift to position that Indians have actually met terms spelled out in ultimatum.

19-20 September 1965

- Third Pakistani Boeing 720 jet since 8 September makes trip to Communist China from Karachi.

20 September 1965

- UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding a cease-fire by 3:00 a.m. EDT 22 September.
- Chinese deliver third note in current series aimed at keeping up pressure on Indians.

[REDACTED] marks one more step by Peking to disengage politically from the situation.

A-7

- Peking People's Daily editorial contains fiercest Chinese attack on Soviet attitude toward Indo-Pakistani conflict. "Soviet leaders" are charged with colluding with US.

20-21 September 1965

21 September 1965

22 September 1965

- Chinese news broadcast notes that Indians have been "secretly" dismantling their military works along Sikkim frontier in alleged attempt to hide evidence of "aggression." Peking plays this as at least partial compliance with Chinese terms and establishes position from which Chinese can close out affair with minimum loss of face.
- Authoritative Peking "Observer" article claims that Indians have complied with Chinese ultimatum but asserts that "matter is far from closed" as personnel and livestock allegedly seized by India have yet to be returned.
- Both India and Pakistan agree to cease-fire to be effective 6:00 p.m. EDT on 22 September.

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23-25 September 1965 - Fourth Pakistani Boeing 720 since 8 September makes flight from Karachi to Canton.


24 September 1965 - Peking broadcasts two diplomatic notes to New Delhi asserting that intruding Indian troops in the Sikkim area have been withdrawn "within the specified time limit." In an apparent effort to maintain some pressure on New Delhi, Chinese reiterate earlier warnings that, if Indians keep up their intrusions, New Delhi will have to "bear all the consequences."

26 September 1965

[REDACTED]

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## INDIA-PAKISTAN